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RECENT DECISIONS

ABSTRACTS
Benjamin M. Quigg, fr.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-WHAT CONSTITUTES BEING "ADVERSELY AFFECTED" so AS To GIVE RIGHT To APPEAL - Pursuant to provisions of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 1 hearings were held by the administrator relating to proposed changes of definitions and standards of certain
canned fruits, as a result of which, amended regulations were promulgated and
issued. These new regulations provided, inter alia, that canners could use, in
part, less expensive sweetening ingredients ( dextrose and corn syrup) without
disclosing on the label, as previously required, that a sugar substitute had been
used. Petitioner (sugar refiners' association) seeks a review of the administrator's
order promulgating these regulations under section 7o I ( f) (I) of the act,
which provides that any person "adversely affected" by such an order may petition the proper United States Circuit Court of Appeals for a judicial review of
the order. Held, petition dismissed. The only interest which petitioner here
alleges is as a competitor supplier of ingredients used in the regulated products,
and the only adverse effect which it alleges is that its competitors (suppliers of
dextrose and corn syrup) are not still hampered by continuance of supposed
detrimental requirement of label disclosure, which petitioner contends removes
a sales resistance on the part of the public to products using such ingredients.
Such an adverse effect, if any, is of not sufficient immediacy and reality to give
8 It seems that it is capability of use for :floating rather than actual use therefor
that counts. Use, though many years ago, obviously is powerful, if not conclusive, evidence of such capability.
" Evidently in the principal case it was urged that the Collins case was an
,"orphan," hence should be overruled. To this Butzel, J.; replied at p. 196: "Even if
it is, such status will cease to exist if it is reaffirmed and adopted by this court in the
cases at bar." The court thus accepts parenthood, but the child still is lonely!
5 Principal case at p. 197.

1

52 Stat. L. 1040 (1938).
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petitioner a right to have the administrators order reviewed. If such a tenuous
likelihood of injury were enough to cause petitioner to be "adversely affected,"
the opportunity for maintaining petitions to review would be so numerous as to
seriously threaten the practical administration of the statute. United States Gane
Sugar Refiners' Llss'n. v. McNutt, (C.C.A. 2d. 1943) 138 F. (2d) u6.2
APPEAL-ORDER QUASHING SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS "FINAL" ORDERPlaintiff's action is brought to recover the amount of compensation and expenses
paid to and for an injured employee of plaintiff, which injury was sustained by
such employee as a result of the negligence of d!!fendant's employee in the act
of unloading defendant's truck. Jurisdiction over defendant, a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Illinois, is based upon service of summons upon
the secretary of state, and notice thereof duly given as required by section 2o(a)
of Motor Vehicle Act.1 Defendant made a special appearance and filed a motion
to quash the service of summons on the ground that the said provision was not
applicable in as much as the cause of action occurred on plaintiff's premises and
not on a public highway. The trial court sustained the motion and quashed the
service of sum~ons. Plaintiff appeals; defendant opposes the appeal on the
ground that an order quashing service of summons is not such a final order from
which an appeal may be prosecuted. Held, affirmed. In respect to the defendant's contentions the court st~ted: the right to appeal is statutory and is limited
to "final judgments, orders or decrees." In order to be a final, appealable order
it is not necessary that it be a final determination of the rights of the parties, but
merely of the particular suit. The order here in question was a final determination that defendant was not amenable to the process of the court served on the
secretary of state, and that upon such service this suit could not proceed furtherto all intents and purposes the cause was finally disposed of; the order quashing
service of summons was, therefore, a final order, and under the statute was
appealable. Brauer Machine & Supply Go. v. Parkhill Truck Go., (Ill. 1943)
50 N.E. (2d) 836.
APPEARANCE - Is APPEARANCE AND DEFENSE ON MERITS IN ATI'ACHMENT SUIT A GENERAL APPEARANCE so THAT PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE A
PERSONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT? -An action f~r breach of contract was instituted in the New Yark state court, jurisdiction being obtained
over defendant by levying a warrant of attachment against defendant's bank
deposit in New Yark. Subsequently, defendant removed to the federal district
court on grounds of diversity of citizenship. Defendant has not yet answered
plaintiff's complaint, but now moves for an order permitting it to appear specially
for the sole purpose of protecting its interest in the attached funds without subjecting itself to the full in personam jurisdiction of the court. Held, motion denied. Rule 64, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, indicates that state laws
relating to the remedy of attachment are to be applied in the federal district
courts within_ the respective states, except that in cases of removal from
2

See generally 42 M1cH. L. REv. 157 (1943).

1

Ill. Stats. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 95¼, § 23.
Id., c. I IO, § 201.
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state courts the Federal Rules are to control if any provisions thereof are applicable. There are, however, no provisions in the Federal Rules controlling the
present question. The law of New York is to the effect that a person participating in the merits of a suit submits to the jurisdiction of the court. In the present
action of attachment any defense on the merits will necessarily involve more than
the mere right to the property involved; it will include also the merits of the
underlying personal claims, so that such defense on the merits should determine
the entire personal rights of the parties. Grant v. Kellogg Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1943) 3 F.R.D. 229.1
ATTORNEYS-WHAT SHOWING NECESSARY FOR REINSTATEMENT AFI'ER
DISBARMENT FOR BRIBING A JUROR-Petitioner was' disbarred from the
practice of law in the state of Massachusetts in 1934 following hearings upon
charges of bribing jurors. In 1939 petitioner sought readmission to practice as an
attorney and his reinstatement was allowed in I 94 I by the superior court. The
Attorney General and the Boston and Massachusetts Bar Associations oppose this
reinstatement, and have requested this court to review the order of the superior
court. Held, order reinstating petitioner annulled. In considering reinstatement
of a disbarred attorney the question is not whether he has been "punished"
enough, but whether there has been such a change in moral character as to make
him worthy of a position of trust, confidence and public service. If there are any
offences so serious that an attorney committing them can never again satisfy the
court of his trustworthiness, the offence of bribing jurors must be one of them.
The evidence on petitioner's behalf as to his moral character, business reputation
and financial credit was brought in by sixty witnesses, including petitioner's personal friends, business associates, lawyers, et al.; but, although the record is creditable as far as it goes, it does not demonstrate any fundamental change of character or of repentance or reform which would constitute a guaranty against repetition of the previous offence. In Re Keenan, (Mass. 1943) 50 N.E. (2d) 785.1
AuTOMOBILEs-WHo Is A NaN-RESIDENT UNDER MoTOR VEHICLE
REGISTRATION LAw? - Plaintiffs, husband and wife, bring this action for
damages to automobile and injuries to plaintiff as a result of collision with defendant's car. Defendant concedes that there was evidence of negligence, but
sets up a defense that plaintiff's car was being operated without legal registration
(i.e. that the vehicle was registered in Pennsylvania when, in fact, plaintiffs
were Massachusetts residents). The testimony showed that plaintiff husband
had come to Massachusetts as a student, had part time teaching jobs there, and
with his wife maintained an apai;tment in Boston; it further showed that plaintiff husband owned real estate and furniture in Pennsylvania, whence he returned with his wife during vacation periods, and where he was a full time member of the summer faculty of a college. The trial judge found that plaintiffs were
1 See "Attack by defendant upon attachment or garnishment as an appearance subjecting him personally to jurisdiction," 55 A.L.R. II21 (1928); 129 A.L.R. 1240
(1940).
1 See "Reinstatement of disbarred or suspended attorney," 48 A.L.R. 1236
(1927).
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residents of Pennsylvania. Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. Held, affirmed. By statute it is provided 1 that non-residents may
operate their automobiles in Massachusetts, if they maintain liability insurance
( the plaintiffs had such insurance), for such lengtli of time as found by the
registrar to be reciprocally permitted by' their state of registration. It was found
by the registrar that Pennsylvania grants residents of Massachusetts unlimited
privilege of operation, and, therefore, if plaintiffs are non-residents, the operation
of their vehicle in Massachusetts was proper. By definition, a non-resident is any
•person whose "legal residence" is not within Massachusetts.2 "Legal residence"
as used in the statute is something more than residence in the ordinary sense;
the legislature conceived of "legal residence" ~s something of which a person
must have only one-it has been used in the sense of a domicil. Within that
definition plaintiffs could be found to be non-residents, and the trial judge so
found. Rummel v. Peters, (Mass. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 57.8
CouRTS-AcrION NoT REMOVABLE To FEDERAL CouRT FROM STATE
COURT UNDER STATUTE PROVIDING THAT SUCH ACTIONS MAY BE "MAINTAINED" IN ANY CouRT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION - Plaintiff instituted
this action in Kentucky circuit court to recover unpaid wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, whereupon defendant removed the action to the United
States district court. Plaintiff has moved to remand the case to the state court.
Held, plaintiff's motion to remand sustained. The language of section 16 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act 1 (i.e. an employee's action for recovery of wages
"may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction") prevents a removal
of this action from a state court, in that the word "maintained" means more than
commenced, and if the defendant is permitted to remove the action to the United
States district court it will not have been "maintained" in the court of competent
jurisdiction where originally filed. This decision is in accord with the rule of the
federal courts that where the queston of r~mand is doubtful the doubt should be
resolved in favor of remanding the action to the state court. Garner v. Mengel
Co., (D.C. Ky. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 794. 2
CoURTS - MoTION FOR NEw TRIAL NoT A WAIVER OF A SIMULTANEOUS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. - SUCCESSOR JUDGE MAY p ASS UPON
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. LEFT UNDECIDED
BY DEATH OF PREDECESSOR - Plaintiff brought action upon cognovit note
executed by defendant; defendant interposed the defense of no consideration.
On 'a jury trial a verdict was rendered for defendant, who the following day filed
motions for order grantipg plaintiff judgment n.o.v., and for order for a new
trial. The trial judge died before passing on these motions; they were heard by
his successor, the motion for judgment n.o.v. being overruled and the motion
for new trial being sustained. Plaintiff appeals. Held, reversed; judgment
Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.,"1932), c. 90, § 3.
Id., c. 90, 1.
3 Cf. 28 VA. L. REv. 284 (1941); 27 lowA L. REv. 464 (1942).

1

2

1
2

52 Stat. L. 1060 at 1069 (1938).
Cf. IO UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1942).
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rendered for plaintiff. A review of the evidence contained in the record indicates
clearly that reasonable minds could arrive at no other conclusion than that there
was consideration for the note, and that the motion for judgment for plaintiff
n.o.v. should have been sustained. Although the questions were not argued,
the court felt constrained to hold: (I) A successor judge, having before him all
of the pleadings and a complete transcript of the evidence, has jurisdiction to pass
upon motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial which have been left undecided by his deceased predecessor ( 2) The filing of a motion for new trial by
a party to the action does not waive the right of that party to insist upon a decision on his motion for a judgment n.o.v. filed simultaneously. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hauk, (Ohio App. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 30.1
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS OBTAINED FROM PERSON
HELD IN CusTODY BuT NoT THERETOFORE TAKEN BEFORE A COMMITTING
OFFICER - Defendants were indicted on charges of treason. Numerous written statements or confessions were obtained. from defendants by agents of the
F.B.I. during period defendants were held in custody, the statements having
been obtained several weeks before defendants were taken before a committing
officer as required by statute.1 Defendants contend that these extra-judicial admissions were improperly admitted 2 because there had been no "commitment"
before a proper federal officer•. The government takes the position that such a
requirement of commitment had been voluntarily waived by defendants, and
that there was therefore no bar to admissibility of the confessions. All the defendants were convicted of treason, and they appeal. Held, reversed and remanded. The said statements of defendants should have been excluded. A
statutory duty to "commit" arrested persons has been placed upon federal officers
which aims to avoid the evils of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime;
to admit evidence obtained in violation thereof would vitiate the effect of the
statute. Assuming, though the evidence is incomplete, that defendants voluntarily consented to remain in custody "without immediate arraignment," thus
waiving the statutory requirement, the court finds that the requirement of "commitment," unlike the right to trial by jury, advice of counsel, and speedy trial
(which may be voluntarily waived with the approval of court), is not an individual right but rather a mandatory duty on arresting officers which cannot
be waived by the person arrested. To so permit would mean that the duties of an
arresting officer were dependent upo_n the action of the arrested person, rather
than upon the action of Congress. United States v. Haupt, (C.C.A. 7th, 1943)
136 F. (2d) 661.
1 Cf. CHI.-KENT L. REv. 275 (1941); 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 198 (1941);
54 A.L.R. 961 (1928).
1 28 Stat. L. 372 at 416 (1894) as amended by 29 Stat. L. 140 at 184 (1896) as
amended by 31 Stat. L. 956 (1901); 18 U.S.C.A. § 595 (1927).
2 Defendants base their contentions upon holdings in: McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943); Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350,
63 S. Ct. 599 (1943). Discussed in "The Federal Rule of Admissibility of Confessions," 27 MARQ. L. REv. 212 (1943). Cf. "Admissibility of confession as affected
by illegal delay in arraignment of prisoner," 94 A.L.R. 1036 (1935). See Professor
Waite's comment on "Evidence-Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence," infra p. 679.
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EVIDENCE - RuLE AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION - UsE
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDING oF TESTIMONY GrvEN UNDER CoMPULsION IN STATE PROCEEDINGS - Defendant was indicted under federal
statute 1 for using the mails to defraud, the particular charge being the "kiting"
of checks (i.e. drawing and mailing checks which were known to have no prospect of being paid). Defendant's fraudulent intent in drawing and m_ailing such
checks was proved by the introduction of !estimony in the nature of admissions
made by him in supplementary proceedings conducted by judgment creditors in
the New York State courts. (Under New York Statute 2 defendant could
not have refused to give such testimony on ground that it was self-incriminating,
since it could not be used against him in a subsequent state prosecution.) Defendant objected to the admission of this testimony in this proceeding as a violation of his constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Defendant was convicted on the·basis of
the charges brought, and now appeals. Held, affirmed. The rul~ against compulsory self-incrimination as laid down in the Fifth Amendment is satisfied if
immunity is given against prosecution by the government compelling the witness
to answer, and does not require that the federal government ,be prohibited from
using testimony given under compulsion in the state courts. Furthermore, the
statute of limitations had run on the offenses of "kiting" in respect to which the
testimony from the supplementary proceedings in the state court was admitted,
and that fact, in effect, gave defendant an immunity against prosecution-which is
the equivalent of the constitutional privilege. The testimony which defendant
gave at said supplementary proceeding was therefore competent: evidence in this
proceeding. United States v. Feldman, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 394.8
1

FEDERAL COURTS-THIRD-PARTY PROCEDURE UNDER FEDER.AL RULES
-Plaintiff seeks to recover for wrongful death of her husband. Prior to expiration of period of statute of limitations defendant served A company with a thirdparty complaint 1 alleging that A company was solely liable on plaintiff's· claim.
After expiration of statutory pepod plaintiff .filed motion pursuant to Rule 14 for
leave to amend the complaint in order to charge A company with liability; A
company opposes motion on ground that claim is barred by statute of limitations.
Held, motion denied. The defendant by instituting third-party proceedings cannot put in issue the question of liability as between the plaintiff and such third
party. Such issue must be raised by amendment of plaintiff's complaint, in which
plaintiff, in effect, attempts to state a new cause of action against such third-party
defendant. Therefore, if plaintiff seeks to amend after expiration of period of
statute of limitations his claim is barred. Lommer v. Scranton Brook Water Co.,
et al., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 3 F.R.D. 27_.2
3-5 Stat. L. u30, § 215 (1909).
New York Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937), § 789. 1
8 See, "Privilege against self-incrimination as extending to danger of prosecution in
another jurisdiction;' 82 A.L.R. 1380 (1933). See also "Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Michigan-Crime Subject to Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction," 4
UNiv. DETROITL. REv. 161 (1941).
1

2

Federal Rules'of C~vil Procedure, rule 14(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 c (1941).
See "Five Years of Federal Third-Party Practice," 29 VA. L. REv. 981 (1943);
also 129A.L.R. 919 (1940).
1

2

1944]

RECENT DECISIONS

LABOR LAW - PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BoARD HAS NO DrsCRETION To DENY EMPLOYER's REQUEST FOR A SECRET ELECTION - Employer filed petitions for review of orders of Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board (I) finding employer guilty of unfair labor practices, and ( 2) certifying,
without election ( although both union and employer had requested an election
pursuant to statute 1 ) , that appellee union was the bargaining agent for employees. The trial court entered an order affirming both the board's orders. On
appeal by employer, it was held: ( r) Affirmed as to order affirming board's
order finding employer guilty of ,unfair labor practices. ( 2) Reversed as to
order certifying appellee as employers' ba_rgaining agent; record remitted to
board for further proceedings. Under the statute the discretion of the board
is limited in respect to certifying representatives without election. The statute
provides that the board may, and upon request of a labor organization, or of an
employer who has not committed unfair labor practices, the board shall, investigate controversies in respect to representatives; the board shall then provide for a
hearing upon such controversy, except that if either party to the controversy requests a secret ballot it shall be held within twenty days. The board is given no
discretion to deny the request for secret ballot, and although an "unfair" employer has no right to initiate an investigation concerning representation, he may,
as "a party to the controversy" after it has been properly instituted, demand, as
of right, a secret ballot. Petition of Shafer, (Pa. 1943) 31 A. (2d) 537.
MASTER AND SERVANT- LIABILITY OF GENERAL EMPLOYER AND SPECIFIC EMPLOYER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE - Defendant county
owned an eight ton road grader which it used for county road repairs, and in
the operation thereof employed defendant' Burton. At the time involved in the
present suit, county had rented the road grader to borough for municipal purposes and had furnished Burton as the operator thereof. Burton was paid on an
hourly basis by the borough and during the course of such work was under the
supervision of the borough's foreman in charge of the operation. Plaintiff was
employed as a laborer on this job and sustained serious injuries when struck by
the road grader operated by Burton. Plaintiff brought suit against county and
Burton for damages; at the trial of the case defendant county's motions for
nonsuit and for directed verdict in its favor were denied. Judgment entered
against both defendants, but only defendant county appeals. Held, affirmed.
The liability of the county must be based upon a relationship of master and servant, and whether the general employer (county) or the specific employer
(borough) is the master depends upon who had the right to exercise control over
the servant. Here the borough's foreman exercised immediate supervision over
Burton and the borough paid his wages, but the borough had no voice in the
selection of Burton, and the county retained the sole right to discharge from its
general employment. From these facts an inference arises that Burton remained
in the general employment of the county so long as he was performing the business entrusted to him by the county. The mere fact that a division of control is
permi_tted does not give rise to an inference that the general employer has surrendered control. The court concluded that there were conflicting inferences
to be drawn from the evidence and sustained the action of the trial court in
1

Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1941), tit. 43, § 2n.7{c).
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submitting the case to the jury. Yonkers v. Ocean County, (N.J. 1943) 33
A. (2d) 898.1
MORTGAGES - REVIVOR OF MORTGAGE DEBT BARRED BY STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS - PRIORITY OF MORTGAGE IN RESPECT TO SUBSEQUENT
LIENORS - Note for $2,500 and mortgage securing one-fifth interest in certain
lands were executed, delivered and recorded, April r6, 1925, due two years
from date. -Judgments against mortgagor were obtained of record March 2,
1936 (judgment A) and October 5, 1937 (judgment B): Iowa statute 1
limits time for bringing of action on written contract to ten years after the cause
accrues. On March 7, 1942, the mortgagor signed a written admission of, and
promise to pay, the indebtedness on said note and mortgage; such a written admission whether made before or after the statute of limitations has run revives
the original cause of action.2 This is a proceeding in a partition suit to determine priority of liens as between the revived mortgage and the judgments entered
subsequent to the mortgage and prior to the revivor. The trial court established
the judgment liens as prior and superior to the mortgage. The mortgage holder
appeals. Held, modified and affirmed. The result obtained by the court is based ·
upon an application of the equitable principle that a junior lienholder, having
notice, actual or constructive, of a valid and enforceable prior lien at the time
_he acquired his rights, takes subject to the possible enlarge~ent-of the prior lien
by an extension of the time of payment. In this case the statute of limitations
expired April r6, 1937; therefore, at the time of the entry of judgment A
(March 2, 1936) the mortgage lien was, as yet, valid and enforceable; however,
when judgment B was entered (October 5, 1937) the mortgage lien was no
longer enforceable, being at that time barred by the statute of limitations. On
those findings the court reaches the following result: the mortgage lien is superior to the lien of judgment .11, judgment A is superior to judgment B, and
the lien of judgment B is superior to the mortgage lien. _The. mortgage holder
cannot complain if he is made junior to the full amount of judgment B; however, the superiority of judgment B is partially relinquished to the amount of
judgment A (so that, in effect, judgment .Ii shares judgment B's superiority to
the mortgage lien) and, as to the amount of such reduction of judgment B's
superior position, judgment B is giv~n a lie·n junior to the mortgage lien. Burns
v. Burns, (Iowa 1943) II N.W. (2d) 461. 3
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - LEGALITY OF AGREEMENT OF FIREMEN
TO AccEPT LESS THAN STATUTORY SALARY -Firemen's Minimum Wage
Act of 1937 provided minimum monthly salary of $175. Being financially
unable to pay these wages, defendant proposed to reduce the personnel of its fire
department; however, in order to induce defendant not to do so, plaintiffs
agreed to accept a lesser salary and not thereafter to claim for the statutory
wages if the number of e_mployees was not reduced. Plaintiffs now sue to re1

Cf. 102 A.L.R. 514 (1936).

1

Iowa Code (1939), § 11007.
Iowa Code (1939), § I 1018.
Cf. 33 A.L.R. 162 (1924), 98 A.L.R. 850 (1935).

2
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cover difference between amounts actually paid since I 937 and the statutory
minimum salary of $ 17 5 per month. Defendant appeals from a judgment of
the appellate court directing judgment in favor of plaintiffs for the full amount
claimed. Held, affirmed. The agreements entered into between plaintiffs and
defendant were invalid as being against the public policy of the state as defined in
the Firemen's Minimum Wage Act of 1937. The plaintiff, therefore, may not
be denied recovery on the basis of promissory estoppel because the promises upon
which the estoppel is predicated were void. Compensation for the performance
of the duties required of the plaintiffs in this case may not be made a matter of
bargaining, and any contract to accept a different compensation than that provided by statute is contrary to public policy and void. Dissent: This case falls
within an exception to the rule that courts will not enforce a contract which is
contrary to public policy. In reliance on the agreement defendant has continued
in its employ many persons whom it planned to discharge and had a right to discharge at any time, and to allow plaintiffs to recover places a great burden up_on
defendant and its taxpayers and does greater harm to the public welfare than
would refusal to enforce the agreement. George v. City of Danville, (ill. 1943)
50 N.E. (2d) 467.1
MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs - QuAsI-CONTRACT LIABILITY Is SUBJECT
TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATION - Plaintiff, an engineer, rendered
services to defendant in connection with a proposed new sewerage system. It
was understood by the parties that pursuant to statute/ payment for any such
improvement must come from revenue bonds payable from income derived from
the improvement itself, and that the issuance of such bonds was subject to approval or rejection by a vote duly taken. Such vote was taken, and the proposal
rejected; the project was therefore abandoned. Plaintiff now sues for the reasonable value of services rendered by him. The financial situation of defendant
is such that if it is liable for amount of plaintiff's claim its total indebtedness will
exceed the constitutional limitation. Plaintiff contends that the proposal having
been abandoned he is now entitled to payment from the general fund in an action
in quantum meruit, and that such liability is one imposed by law, not voluntarily
assumed, and not within the constitutional limitation on indebtedness. From
a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Held, affirmed. Provisions as to
debt limits apply only to indebtednesses which arise ex contractu and do not apply
to liability involuntarily incurred. However, the liability of defendant in this
case, if any, was not involuntarily incurred; both parties were aware of the contingent nature of payment. Plaintiff's claim is essentially based upon a contract
implied in fact, therefore ex contractu, rather than upon a quasi-contract obligation involuntarily imposed by law for the wrongful avoidance of a contract.
Hancock v. Village of Hazel Crest, (ill. App. 1943) 47 N.E. (2d) 55'7.
REs }tmlCATA-CLAss SuIT-EFFECT OF JUDGMENT ON PERSONS
REPRESENTED - Plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory judgment deter1 See ''Validity of agreement by public officer to accept less than compensation or
fees fixed by law," 70 A.L.R. 972 (1931), 118 A.L.R. 1458 (1939).
1

III. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1942), c. 24, § 62-1 through§ 62-12.
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mining drainage bonds of defendant county held by plaintiff to be valid, and for a
- mandatory injunction requiring county officials to levy assessments and to advance money from the general fund to drainage fund for the payment of the
bonds. Defendant filed motion to dismiss plaintiff's bill on the ground that the
matter was res judicata, all the bonds of this issue having been held. to be null and
void in a suit in the federal court 1 to which the present defendants were' all parties. In that action the federal court determined the controversy to be a class suit,
and, as such, was binding on all bondholders, including plaintiff. Plaintiff now
claims that-it is not bound by the previous decision of the federal court, it being
not a true class suit, the judgment ,therein rendered being in personam and
therefore binding only on the parties thereto. The trial court entered decree
granting defendant's motion; plaintiff appeals. Held, affirmed. The relief
sought in the federal court suit and in the instant 0J1e is a declaration of validity
of the bonds, a tax assessment, a l~vy. on lands in the district, and a distribution
of. the fund thereby made available;, it was the purpose of the federal court suit
to place a lien u})on the real estate of the taxpayers, not to obtain a personal judgment against them. The proceedings in both cases are in rem, therefore plaintiff
is bound by the federal court adjudication as a member-of the class.of bondholders properly and adequately repres 7nted therein. International Typographical
Union v. Macomb County, (Mich. 1943) I I N.W. (2d) 242. 2
,•
SALES- RIGHT OF SELLER TO REFUSE FUTURE DELIVERIES WHERE
BUYER HAS REFUSED TO MAKE INSTALLMENT p AYMENT BECAUSE OF ALLEGED BREACH OF WARRANTY- Under a certain sales contract seller undertook to _deliver leather to buyer ID installments, payment therefor to be made on
the fifteenth day of each month for all goods delivered the preceding month.
Buyer alleges that the leather delivered in June, 1941, was of inferior quality;
thereupon buyer refused to make payment for the June deliveries, demanded
replacement thereof, and asked for delivery of entire balance of leather under
the contract within three days. Seller declined to recognize any claim for breach
of warranty, requested payment for June deliveries, and notified buyer that it
would send no more leather under the contract. Buyer brought an action for
damages for breach of warranty and for non-delivery of balance of the leather.
'Seller then brought a cross-action to recover contract price of June, 1941, shipments, and in his answer buyer set up a claim in recoupment for inferior quality
of leather in the June shipment. The actions were tried together; in the seller's
action judgment was rendered for seller, less an amount allowed in reduction of
contract price for the breach of warranty; in the buyer's action the lower court
found for the seller ( thus recognizing that recovery for breach of warranty had
been allowed in judgment in seller's suit, and denying recovery for non-delivery
of balance of the goods)-buyer appeals. Held, reversed; further proceedings
ordered. Whether or not failure to make payment when due for successive shipments under ,a divisible contract is a material and substantial breach so as to entitle
1 Bloqmfield Drain Dist. v. Keefe, 119 F. (2d) 157 (1941); certiorari denied,
314 U.S. 649, 650, 62 S. Ct. 95 (1942).
·
2 See "Contemporary Function of the Class Suit," 8 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 684
(1942); "Identity or community of interests essential to class or representative suit,"
132 A.L.R. 749 (1941); cf. 128 A.L.R. 392 (1940).
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seller to consider the entire contract broken and to refuse further deliveries thereunder, is usually a question of fact. The record in this case shows a general
finding for the seller, and, therefore, it must have been found that buyer's failure
to pay was a material breach-however, if the buyer was justified in refusing
payment for the June deliveries, this finding was erroneous. By common law and
by statute 1 a buyer may set up against the seller a claim for breach of warranty
by way of recotipment in reduction of the purchase price of goods, and in as much
as here the extent of damages for the breach required litigation, buyer's refusal to
make payment for June shipments when due was not such a breach as gave
seller the right to refuse further performance. This breach by the seller would
entitle the buyer to recover for non-delivery of the balance of the leather.
Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co., Inc., (Mass. 1943) 50 N.E. (2d) 962.2
WILLS -

DocTR.INE OF ELECTION APPLIED TO AcTION FOR BREACH OF

CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL-In consideration for testator's promise that
he would execute a will devising to complainants a share of his estate equal in
value to the share given to his brothers and sisters, complainants conveyed to
testator two houses and lots which had descended to complainants as heirs of
testator's late wife. Testator died in July, 1942, and left will devising to complainants the two properties which they had conveyed to him, and bequeathed to
each one hundred dollars in cash. The greater part of his estate went to his
own brothers and sisters. Complainants bring this action against testator's
executor and brothers and sisters seeking to recover on breach of contract to
make a will in their favor the difference between value of the property received
by them under the will and the share to which they were entitled under the
alleged agreement. Defendants answered by denying all material allegations.
Complainants filed an amended bill alleging, inter alia, that they do not release
what was devised and bequeathed to them under the said will. Defendants
thereupon filed a motion that complainants be required to elect whether they
will prosecute for damages for breach of contract, or will seek to recover the
specific property devised by will. The motion was sustained; complainants appeal therefrom alleging in their assignments of error, inter alia, that they should
not be required to make an election because the testator did not give to others
anything that belonged to complainants. Held, affirmed. The doctrine of election is not limited to instances where the testator gives away property belonging
to a legatee or devisee, but has application wherever a person is claiming inconsistent rights in regard to the same subject matter, as here where complainants
are seeking to retain benefits under the will, and at the same time claiming
against the will by suing defendants because the value of these devises and bequests is not as great as what they had hoped to receive. One who accepts a
benefit under a will must accept the whole will and ratify every po~tion of it.
Elmore 'll, Covington, (Tenn. 1943) 172 S. W. (2d) 809.1
Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed., 1932), c. 106, § 58 (1) {a) (b).
See "Right of seller to rescind or refuse further deliveries on buyer's failure to
pay for installments," 14 A.L.R. 1209 (1921) ;- 15 A.L.R. 609 (1922). Cf. 19
CH1~KENT L. REv. 207 (1941); 29 A.L.R. 1517 (1924).
1

2

1

See 69 A.L.R. 102 (1930), 106 A.L.R. 754 (1937).
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WILLS-RIGHT UNDER LAPSE STATUTE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
TO TAKE PARENT'S LEGACY IN GRANDFATHER'S WILL - RIGHT OF
AnoPTED CHILD To INHERIT THROUGH NATURAL PARENT -Testator by
the terms of his will left all of his estate to his son, who predeceased him. The
son-had two illegitimate children, but they became legitimate upon adoption by
the father according to statute/ although the parents did not intermarry; one
of the children was later adopted by strangers. The state intervened contending that testator left no surviving heirs and that his estate escheated to the state
( i.e. that under the "lapse" statute 2 the legatee dying before the testator left no
lineal descendants). The children stood together in opposing the state, but as
between themselves it is contended that the child adopted by strangers lost her
legal status as the child of her natural father, and therefore cannot claim as a
lineal descendant under the "lapse" statute. The trial court held that the two
children share the estate equally. On appeal it was held, affirmed. The statute
which provides that an illegitima~e child, in the absence of intermarriage of its
parents, does not represent its parent by inheriting estate of parent's kindred 8
has no application to prevent an illegitimate child from taking as lineal descendant under provisions of the lapse statute, where such child has been statutorily
adopted. Such statute is controlling only where the illegitimate child is claiming as his parent's representative; here the children are claiming in their own
right as lineal descendants-there was, therefore, no escheat of property to the
state. As regards the claim between the two children, the court held that although the child adopted by strangers severed her legal relationship· toward her
natural parent, her status as a blood relative of the kindred of her natural parent
was not altered; and the right of the child to inherit as lineal descendant of her
natural parent continued notwithstanding a newly acquired right of inheritance
• from adopting parents. Both children, therefore, inherit equally their grandfather's estate. In re Esposito's Estate, (Cal. App. 1943) 135 P. (2d) 167.4
WILLS- HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS STATUTE REQUIREMENT OF A "DATE"
SATISFIED BY MONTH AND YEAR WITHOUT DAY OF MoNTH - Montana
statute 1 requires that holographic wills be "entirely written, dated, and signed"
by the testator. Decedent's will was written entirely in testator's hand and signed
by her, and was dated "this day of May, 1938." The executor named in the
document attempted to have the writing probated as a holographic will. An
order was entered refusing to admit to probate the writing offered, and from
that order the executor appeals. Held, probate allowed. Tracing the English
word "date" back to the Latin "datum," the court finds that the word is more
properly used to designate that part of a document giving the place and/or time
the instrument was made, rather than figures or words designating the actual time
when the execution took place. In as much as the legislature has required, inter-.
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941), § 230.
Cal. Prob. Code {Deering, 1941), § 92.
3 Id. § 255.
4 31 CAL. L. REv. 439 (1943). See also "Descent and Distribution: Effect of
Illegitimacy and Legitimation in California," 29 CAL. L. REv. 185 (1941). Ct
generally 115 A.L.R. 444 (1938) and So A.L.R. 1403 (1932).
1

2

1

Montana Rev. Codes {1<j35), § 6981.
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alia, that holographic wills be "dated" and has made no specific requirements of
day, month and year, the court would be invading the field reserved for the
legislature if it should alter and amend·the simple and clear definition of a holographic will as contained in the statute. This decision is in line with rules contained in Montana Statutes 2 requiring liberality of interpretation, and conforms
with the general concept of holographic wills that they need not be full and complete as to form, writing, signature, or date, so long as the minimum statutory
requirements are met. Concurring: Unless more than one will is presented for
probate or the question of testator's mental capacity is raised, the day of the month
month of execution of the will is unimportant. In re Irvine's Estate, (Mont.
1943) 139 P. (2d) 489. 3
WILLS-VALIDITY OF WILLS ON SEPARATE SHEETS OF PAPER-The
order of the orphans' court directed the register of wills to refuse probate of
three folded but unattached holographic papers found in a sealed envelope. The
papers were admittedly testamentary in nature, were identical in form, and were
entirely in handwriting of one of the testat?rs; but each sheet set forth separate
provisions for distribution of property of decedents, there were no unfinished
sentences on any page which connected it with the following page, and signatures
of testators appeared only on the third sheet. On appeal to the supreme court
the decree was reversed and the papers ordered admitted to probate by a four to
three decision. The Pennsylvania courts have adopted the rule that a will made
on separate sheets of paper is sufficient if the pages "are connected by their
internal sense, by coherence or adaptation o~ parts." The entire court is in agreement that this is a proper test, but they differ in the construction of the words;
the majority maintains that the pages may be coherent and legally integrated
into a will if they "contain nothing incongruous or out of harmony • • • or if
the several parts suit, fit in and are adaptable as a will," while the minority finds
no integration unless the connection is apparent on its face, as by continuance
from one page to another of an unfinished sentence or paragraph. It is further
suggested in a concurring opinion that in as much as the papers were found in a
sealed envelope they were as effectually fastened together as with a metal fastener.
The court rejects the suggested "possibility of fraud" test as impractical because
thereunder any will made so that a fraud might have been perpetrated could
be denied probate, and, furthermore, there was no charge of tampering or fraud
in the present case. In re Covingto-r?s Estate, (Pa. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 235.1
2
8

Montana Rev. Codes (1935), §§ 8757, 8761, 8762, 8770, 8771.
Cf. annotation on dating of wills in L. R. A., 1916 E, 498.

1 Rehearing denied Aug. 12, 1943. Cf. annotation on validity of will written on
disconnected sheets, 30 A. L. R. 424 (1924), 71 A. L. R. 530 (1931).

